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10 A View of Scientific Methodology as a Source 




The claims— that the agricultural uses of genetically engineered organisms 
(GEOs) and consumption of their products are safe, and using GEOs in 
farming practices is indispensable for meeting the food and nutrition needs 
of the world’s growing population— play central roles in arguments defend-
ing the legitimacy of using GEOs. They are widely endorsed by mainstream 
scientists.
David Magnus maintains that those who challenge these claims deploy 
a variety of agnotology mechanisms. In particular, construct agnotology 
(exaggerating the degree and kind of uncertainty that mark certain scien-
tific results) is commonly deployed “by anti- industry NGOs to oppose the 
creation of genetically engineered organisms,” instigate doubts and main-
tain ignorance among the public about the credibility of the “mainstream 
view . . . that most GEOs are safe and that, in principle, the technology can 
be safely utilized,” and propose a version of the precautionary principle 
that “largely rejects risk management and the very idea of a science- based 
regulatory policy” (Magnus 2008, 251, 258).
Philip Kitcher points to another agnotology mechanism: rejecting evi-
dentially supported claims because of the interests they serve. The oppo-
nents of using GEOs, Kitcher (2011, 238– 239) maintains, “dismiss scientific 
reports to the effect that environmental risks are minimal as reflecting mon-
ied interests,” and he continues, noting that “opposition to GEOs is largely 
a European phenomena, not much heard in the land of the potential pro-
ducers (North America), nor in those of its potential consumers (Africa, 


























with what they see as the scruples of people who do not feel any threat of 
starvation.” There are opponents of using GEOs who are properly criticized 
in these ways, such as those who— alleging religious reasons, adopting trivi-
alized versions of the precautionary principle, displaying ignorance of sci-
entific developments, or dismissing all proponents of GEOs simply on the 
ground that they are purveyors of capitalist interests— would remain oppo-
nents regardless of the scientific record. That said, the opponents are not all 
alike. In this chapter, I will discuss opponents whose posture toward GEOs 
derives from engaging in agricultural practices such as agroecology, and 
holding that there is considerable scientific support for the claim that there 
are ways to engage in agriculture that are more likely than GEO- oriented 
(and conventional) ways to be sustainable over the long term and ensure 
food security (and other human rights) for the poor.
I agree with Magnus and Kitcher that agnotology mechanisms are in 
play in the controversies about GEOs. Contrary to them, however, I locate 
the mechanisms principally in the arguments defending the legitimacy of 
using GEOs. I will contend that the two claims stated at the outset are 
not well supported by the available empirical evidence and should not be 
endorsed, and despite this, their widespread endorsement is made pos-
sible (in significant part) because an inadequate conception of scientific 
methodology has wide currency among mainstream scientists. Those who 
uphold this conception downplay the scientific credentials of methodolog-
ical approaches that are apt for gaining knowledge about certain kinds of 
risks of using GEOs and the possibilities of alternative forms of farming. 
Hence they do not attempt to obtain such knowledge, or pay attention to 
the input of the opponents who emphasize sustainability and food secu-
rity for all. Ignorance about these risks and alternatives is thereby fostered, 
and claims about them that lack proper empirical support are enabled to 
pass for scientific knowledge. All this functions to protect the legitimacy of 
using GEOs from empirically based challenges and mars the deliberations 
of many public regulatory bodies. Proponents of using GEOs, by treating 
all opponents as alike, end up only showing the fallacies of points of view 
that are also rejected by opponents who raise serious questions about the 
legitimacy of using GEOs. The latter opponents (contrary to Kitcher) are 
to be found largely in movements in poor countries such as Brazil, where I 
regularly engage with them (see, for example, Carneiro et al. 2015; Ferment 
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strong international connections, such as the network La Via Campesina, 
which proposes that practices and policies of food sovereignty, in which 
agroecology has a central place, provide the best way to assure food secu-
rity for poor peoples (Lacey 2015b).1 They also have strong connections 
with certain nongovernmental organizations, public agricultural research 
bodies, agricultural researchers (especially those connected with agroecol-
ogy), and international bodies that deal with agricultural policies. They 
do not reject biotechnological innovations out of hand, introduce some 
(not GEOs) into their agroecological practices, and advocate for “science- 
based regulatory policy” (see, for example, Traavik and Ching 2007), which 
(they maintain) should be sufficiently encompassing so as to be informed 
by empirical investigation of the causes, including socioeconomic ones, of 
problems like food insecurity (Lacey 2005, 2017b).
These opponents challenge the two claims that using GEOs and their 
products is safe as well as indispensable for meeting the world’s growing 
food needs. That does not put them in conflict with claims for which there 
is consensus among the relevant scientists (or with any well- confirmed 
scientific knowledge). Despite repeated allegations, there is not consensus 
concerning the two claims among the relevant scientists (Ferment et al. 
2015; Hilbeck et al. 2015; Krimsky 2015). Moreover, even if there were, that 
might not indicate that the claims have strong evidential support, for con-
sensus might derive from values and interests shared among the scientists 
that (consciously or not) draw attention away from crucial matters that 
need to be investigated. Of course, just citing this possibility cannot ground 
responsible challenges to claims that many scientists endorse; rather, such 
challenges depend on demonstrating that the available evidence is not 
adequate to support the claims and putting forward evidence (or proposing 
specific further research projects) that is pertinent for evaluating them as 
well as identifying the factors that explain why they are widely endorsed. 
The opponents, whose primary preoccupations are with sustainability and 
securing food security for everyone, assume this threefold responsibility. 
They do not make use of the agnotology mechanisms indicated by Magnus 
and Kitcher. It is true that they often suggest that scientists, who put the 
1 For more on La Via Campesina, see https://viacampesina.org/en/. Food First: Insti-
tute for Food and Development Policy regularly publishes material representative of 


























authority of science behind using GEOs, are in the grip of the values of 
technological progress and of capital and the market. For them, however, 
that is not a ground for rejecting the claims of these scientists or ignoring 
evidence they may put forward but instead part of the explanation of why, 
despite inadequate supporting evidence, these scientists endorse the two 
claims, and why they are unaware of the agnotology mechanisms (includ-
ing the one to be discussed below with roots in an inadequate conception 
of scientific methodology) at play in their arguments.
2. What Is in Dispute?
The controversies about GEO crops (and their products) principally have to 
do with the legitimacy and social value of using GEOs— growing, harvest-
ing, and distributing them, and processing and consuming their products, 
in the agroecosystems in which they are planted and cultivated, and in the 
socioeconomic contexts in which they are developed, produced, marketed, 
processed, and consumed— and their intensive utilization and widespread 
diffusion throughout the world in the agricultural practices that produce 
major crops as well as the place that should be accorded to research, devel-
opment, and implementation of GEOs in national and international agri-
cultural policies (for details and documentation, see Lacey 2005, 125– 147). 
Judgments concerning legitimacy draw on claims made about benefits, 
risks, and alternative farming practices.2 Legitimacy presupposes efficacy 
(Lacey 2005, 2016), and although there are questions about the long- term 
efficacy of using particular varieties of GEOs and the risks that may arise 
when their efficacy declines, and some exaggerated claims have been made 
about what can be expected in the future (Lacey 2017a), efficacy will not be 
at issue in the present argument.
2.1. Risks and Alternatives
Arguments for the legitimacy of using GEOs draw on claims like the 
following:
No risk: Current and anticipated uses of GEOs for agricultural and related commer-
cial purposes occasion no significant risks to human health or the environment 
2 Regarding the real and promised benefits of GEOs (not discussed in this chapter) 
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that cannot be (and normally are) managed adequately under scientifically 
informed regulations, and the GEOs currently being used have occasioned no 
significant harm.
No alternative: There are no alternative kinds of farming that could be prac-
ticed— in place of the currently deployed GEO- oriented ways and those being 
developed (including those being developed with new and more complex meth-
ods of genetic engineering)— that could be expected to produce comparable ben-
efits connected with productivity, sustainability, and meeting human needs, and 
would not occasion unacceptable risks (for example, not producing enough food 
to feed the world’s growing population). GEOs are necessary to feed the world, 
and will gain an increasingly important role in doing so.
The opponents, who emphasize sustainability and food security for all, 
make competing claims like the following:
There are risks: Available scientific evidence does not support endorsing “no risk,” 
and in part this reflects serious shortcomings in the risk assessments that have 
informed regulatory deliberations. Furthermore, using GEOs has caused harm 
to human health as well as the environment and social arrangements (some of 
which may be irreversible), and further harm is risked by continuing to use them 
and expand their use— where the mechanisms involved include those linked with 
the necessity of using some GEOs in conjunction with agrotoxics, and others 
linked with the socioeconomic context of the research, development, and use of 
GEOs.
Better alternatives: Agroecological methods (among others) are being developed 
that enable high productivity of essential crops with less serious risk. They pro-
mote sustainable agroecosystems, utilize and protect biodiversity, contribute to 
the health and social emancipation of poor communities, and are particularly 
well suited to enable rural populations in developing countries to be well fed and 
nourished. Without their further development, the current patterns of hunger are 
likely to continue.
Values influence judgments about what is considered a risk, what risks 
are serious enough to require investigation, what are desirable properties of 
agroecosystems, and hence judgments about what the specific objects of sci-
entific inquiries about risks and alternatives should be (Lacey 2005, 2017a, 
2017b). The values that are incorporated into the opponents’ stance (and 
also into the precautionary principle) include social justice, popular partici-
pation, empowerment of the excluded, ecological and social sustainability, 
respect for the full range of human rights, and equity within and between 
generations (Lacey 2005, 138; 2015b). There is tension between these val-


























connected with technological progress— including granting high ethical/
social value to expanding the capacity of human beings to control natural 
objects especially as embodied in technological innovations, innovations 
that increase the penetration of technology ever more intrusively into ever 
more domains of human life, and the definition of problems in ways that 
may permit scientifically informed technological solutions (Lacey 2005, 
18– 24)— and with capital and the market, such as economic growth (Lacey 
2005, 137).3
Contrasting “no risk”/“there are risks” and “no alternative”/“better alter-
natives” enables us to clarify the role of scientific research in dealing with 
questions of legitimacy and its interplay with values (Lacey 2016, 2017b). 
As indicated above, proponents of using GEOs often assert that “no risk” 
and “no alternative” are backed by scientific consensus. The opponents 
counter that while much remains open to further investigation, the pre-
ponderance of available evidence points toward “there are risks” and “bet-
ter alternatives” (Lacey 2015b). Their argument, without foreclosing that 
there could be roles for GEOs under certain conditions alongside other agri-
cultural methods, leads to the conclusions that they are not needed now 
and their current uses are (on balance) harmful. Furthermore, they point to 
the kinds of research that are needed to provide additional scientific input 
relevant for making sound judgments about risks and alternatives (Lacey 
2005, 2015b).
2.2. Conceptions of Scientific Methodology
Behind the disagreements about risks, alternatives, and what is supported 
by scientific evidence lies a (usually unarticulated) disagreement concern-
ing scientific methodology. To make this apparent, I will make use of the 
notion of methodological strategy (Lacey 1999, 2005). The principal roles of 
a strategy are to constrain the kinds of hypotheses, models, and theories 
that may be entertained in a research project, and so specify the kinds of 
phenomena and possibilities that may be explored as well as the conceptual 
resources that may be deployed, and select the kinds of empirical data that 
are relevant for appraising the hypotheses that are entertained.
3 “There are risks” refers to risks to social arrangements; “no risk” does not. Propo-
nents of using GEOs tend to maintain that bringing social effects into the discussion 
reflects “ideology” or “politics”— perhaps relevant in regulatory deliberations, but 
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To a first approximation, I consider scientific inquiry to be systematic 
empirically based inquiry, conducted under strategies that are apt for gain-
ing and confirming knowledge and understanding of the phenomena being 
investigated (Lacey 2005, 64– 65). This characterization leaves two matters 
open. First, the results of scientific inquiry may not all have the same cog-
nitive status. When investigating the ecological and social complexities of 
agroecosystems— for instance, those connected with the disputes about the 
risks of using GEOs and alternatives to doing so— even extensive scientific 
inquiry, conducted within available time frames, will often not be able to 
produce results that meet the empirical and cognitive standards required to 
establish items of confirmed scientific knowledge. It may, however, provide 
sufficient evidence to endorse a hypothesis, that is, to judge— after taking 
into account the consequences of acting informed by it, if it were false, and 
their ethical salience— that the evidence supporting it is sufficiently strong 
to legitimate acting or forming policy in ways informed by it (Lacey 2015c). 
Second, different kinds of strategies may be needed to investigate different 
kinds of phenomena— for example, one kind to investigate the structures 
of plant genomes and ways to alter them, and others to investigate the 
environmental and social effects of using them as well as the possibilities of 
sustainable agroecosystems.
2.2.1. Decontextualizing Strategies The great success of scientific 
inquiry is often held to derive from the adoption in research of decontextu-
alizing strategies (DSs) (Lacey 2016), and sometimes it is held that the prod-
ucts of research conducted under DSs satisfy superior cognitive standards, 
or that the nature of scientific inquiry is to privilege adopting DSs.4 Under 
the most widely used DSs, theories are constrained to represent (or model) 
phenomena in relation to their (hypothesized) underlying structures, the 
processes and interactions of the structures and their components, and the 
laws that govern them.5 Representing phenomena in this way decontextu-
alizes them. It dissociates them from any link they may have with human 
agency, value, sensory qualities, and social arrangements, and whatever 
possibilities they may afford by virtue of their places in particular social, 
4 For an elaboration on DSs, previously called “materialist strategies,” see Lacey 
1999, 2005.
5 These DSs are also reductionist strategies; causal interaction from higher to lower 
levels of organization of phenomena and systems is not entertained under them. DSs 


























human, and (frequently) ecological contexts, including (in the case of 
GEOs) those they may afford by virtue of specific features of the agroecosys-
tems in which they are planted and cultivated together with the socioeco-
nomic contexts in which they have been developed, produced, marketed, 
and processed. Theories entertained under DSs dispense with the catego-
ries, including intentional and value ones, routinely deployed for describ-
ing and understanding what is experienced as well as deliberating when 
making decisions. Thus, for example, under DSs, GEOs are investigated for 
their genomic and molecular biological properties, and the effects that are 
triggered by these properties and changes of them, but not for the effects 
of using them that follow from their being objects to which intellectual 
property rights obtain. Complementing these constraints on admissible 
theories, empirical data are selected, sought out (often using mechanized 
surrogates for human observers), and reported (or mechanically stored, 
manipulated, and transmitted) using descriptive categories that generally 
are applicable by virtue of measurement, instrumental, and experimental 
operations. Data are not selected concerning, say, who owns and uses GEO 
seeds, and under what conditions, or the impact their use has on biodiver-
sity, small- scale farmers, and worldwide food security.
Adopting DSs has been extraordinarily fruitful, and we may expect that 
it will continue to be so. Under DSs, knowledge and understanding of an 
enormous and varied array of phenomena have been obtained, and since 
DSs admit of considerable variety deriving from the different kinds of laws 
and explanatory models that may be incorporated into a strategy’s con-
straints, they are also highly versatile. Their fruitfulness and versatility con-
tribute to explain why many hold it to be of the nature of scientific inquiry 
to adopt DSs predominantly (if not exclusively), and why this view is so 
deeply entrenched that the possibility that there might also be other fruit-
ful strategies is rarely entertained explicitly in the scientific mainstream.
When proponents of using GEOs insist that they have the backing of 
scientific authority, they are effectively taking for granted a methodological 
view like the following:
Primacy of DSs: The adoption of DSs has primacy, perhaps virtual exclusivity, 
among the methodologies of scientific research.
For them, the research that has led to the development of GEOs and con-
firmed the efficacy of using them is exemplary of scientific research, since 
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adopted in it; and sound scientific risk assessment and research aimed at 
improving agricultural practices would be marked by the virtually exclu-
sive adoption of DSs. The tradition of modern science has tended to foster 
“primacy of DSs,” and upholding it is reinforced where economic growth 
and related values are considered socially preeminent, and technoscientific 
innovation is considered a driving force of economic growth (Lacey 2016), 
so that now the reach of DSs keeps expanding with no end in sight. More-
over, when it is maintained (as it widely is today) that engaging in research 
conducted under DSs is a principal and indispensable source for meeting 
human needs in general, and specifically, for making improvements in agri-
cultural and other practices, there may seem to be no reason to look beyond 
“primacy of DSs.”
2.2.2. Context- Sensitive Strategies The opponents of using GEOs who 
are also proponents of sustainability and food security for all recognize that 
many technoscientific innovations lead to generally available benefits, and 
hence that research conducted under DSs is often socially significant. They 
question, however, that there is factual support for the role claimed for that 
research in contributing to meeting human needs and improving agricul-
tural practices (Lacey 2015b, 2016, 2017a). They point out that currently 
unmet needs (for example, for food security for many poor people) have 
social, economic, and historical dimensions and causes, as do other prob-
lems endemic to the current hegemonic food/agricultural system, such as 
unsustainable and excessively polluting practices, and the destruction of 
fragile ecosystems that accompanies efforts to obtain access to more farm-
land. If something is to be done about these problems, the fundamental 
causes of their origin and persistence need to be identified. But DSs do 
not suffice for investigating the causal networks in which the problems are 
enmeshed.6 To this end, strategies that do not involve dissociation from the 
social, economic, and historical contexts of phenomena are also needed; I 
call them context- sensitive strategies (CSs).
6 That there is abundant food being produced today, more than enough to feed 
everyone alive now, may largely be attributed to the innovations of the green revo-
lution that have been informed by research conducted largely under DSs. But as is 
now manifest, producing such abundant supplies of food is compatible with hunger 
and malnutrition persisting on a large scale, and the farming practices that enable 
it causing environmental and social devastation. Without CSs the causes of these 


























Furthermore, some kinds of evidence, needed for addressing the oppo-
sitions about risks and alternatives, can be obtained only from research 
in which CSs are adopted. Adopting CSs is needed to investigate the 
possibilities— which if realized, might help to redress the problems referred 
to in the previous paragraph— that may be open to alternative forms of 
agriculture not based on the intensive utilization of GEOs or other techno-
scientific innovations, such as agroecology, the alternative highlighted in 
the statement of “better alternatives.” The successes of agroecology are well 
documented and lend support to endorsing “better alternatives” (Rosset 
and Altieri 2017; Lacey 2005, 212– 223; Lacey 2015a; section 4 below). Agro-
ecology integrally incorporates an approach to farming, a body of scientific 
research and its results, and a social movement (Rosset and Altieri 2017; 
Lacey 2015a). In the scientific research of agroecology, CSs are adopted that 
enable agroecosystems to be investigated with respect to how they fare in 
light of such desiderata as productivity, ecological sustainability and the 
preservation of biodiversity, social health, and the strengthening of local 
people’s culture and agency, frequently with a view toward discovering the 
conditions under which an appropriate balance of the desiderata may be 
brought about in particular agroecosystems (Lacey 2015a).
Certain kinds of risks of using GEOs also cannot be adequately investi-
gated without adopting CSs as well as DSs, such as risks that may be occa-
sioned by mechanisms that are grounded in GEOs being commercial objects 
whose uses are constrained by claims of intellectual property rights (Lacey 
2016, 2017b). They include risks that may be a consequence of the inad-
equate enforcement of regulations designed to ensure the safety of using 
GEOs, and the risks (intensifying those they share with “conventional” 
capital- , input- , and machine- intensive forms of farming) of undermining 
alternative forms of farming, displacing and impoverishing rural work-
ers as well as weakening the conditions for them to exercise their agency, 
and bringing the world’s food supply increasingly under the control of a 
few market- oriented corporations, potentially intensifying food insecurity 
throughout the world (Lacey 2015b, 2017b). Noteworthy among the risks 
that cannot be investigated where only DSs are adopted are those that may 
arise when GEOs are introduced— with the stated objective of dealing with 
problems of small- scale farmers (for instance, production in precarious agro-
ecosystems) and their communities (say, hunger and malnutrition)— under 
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first place and account for their persistence. Vitamin- enhanced genetically 
engineered crops, for example, are being developed with the aim of com-
bating diseases caused by vitamin deficiencies, but the research involved 
disregards that currently developed GEOs fit into and generally require 
the same socioeconomic arrangements in which this problem came about 
and persists (Lacey 2005, 171– 180), and that implementing such projects 
requires inserting farming practices into international market structures, 
and in doing so, that there might be harmful human, social, and ecological 
consequences and (above all) “better” alternatives.
The opponents, who are preoccupied with sustainability and food secu-
rity for all, give high salience to the investigation of the possibilities of 
sustainable agroecosystems and agroecological practices, and the possible 
effects of using GEOs on the environment, people, and social arrangements. 
The strategies adopted in the research that led to the development of GEOs, 
however (and in general DSs), are insufficient to conduct this investigation 
adequately, for it requires adopting CSs as well as DSs. This research thus 
incorporates the methodological view:
Strategic pluralism: The methodologies of science must allow for the adoption of 
CSs as well as DSs— in order to enable investigation of the full and diverse range 
of phenomena of which understanding may be sought.
CSs are complementary to DSs; they do not displace DSs from their roles in 
investigations for which they are apt, and all research conducted under CSs 
may be able to make use of some knowledge gained under DSs
To maintain that there are phenomena that cannot be adequately inves-
tigated exclusively under DSs is not to be “antiscience,” “ideological,” or 
“ignorant,” nor a rejection of “science- based” risk management and regu-
latory policy. Whether or not there can be systematic, empirically based 
investigation conducted under CSs— producing results that are positively 
appraised in light of the same cognitive criteria that are used for apprais-
ing results obtained under DSs— remains open to the test of the practice 
of a robust methodological pluralism. As indicated above, I think that 
research conducted in agroecology shows that this test can be passed. What 
is important is that unless CSs are adopted, it is not possible to confirm 
the kinds of knowledge needed to make sound endorsements about risks, 
alternatives, and the causal networks of unmet food needs. Denying the 


























the “primacy of DSs” fosters ignorance about these matters, and when 
they are denied, holding “primacy of DSs” can function as an agnotology 
mechanism— and it currently does so when “no risk” and “no alternative” 
are endorsed.7 Whether one holds “primacy of DSs” or “strategic plural-
ism,” currently available empirical evidence does not favor endorsing “no 
risk” and “no alternative” (as will be elaborated in the next sections). If 
“scientific” research is restricted to adopting DSs virtually exclusively, “sci-
entific” evidence that supports endorsing “there are risks” (except those 
investigated within standard risk assessments; see the next section) and 
“better alternatives” could not be obtained, but there could be such evi-
dence obtained from systematic empirical inquiry conducted under CSs as 
well as under DSs. This has far- reaching implications for how to understand 
“science- based risk management and regulatory policy.”
3. Risks
Although all parties recognize that there may be risks occasioned by using 
GEOs, there are disputes about their significance— their character, ethical 
seriousness, magnitude, extent, contexts in which they might arise, mecha-
nisms, likelihood of the harm risked actually being brought about, man-
ageability under well- designed regulations, the range of methodologies 
needed to investigate them, and whether using GEOs has already brought 
about significant harm. Empirical evidence supporting “no risk” would 
derive from the failure, after making appropriate efforts, to find empirical 
evidence supporting that there are significant risks— and its endorsement 
should depend on sufficient research of the appropriate kind having been 
conducted.
3.1. Standard Risk Assessments
Generally those who affirm “no risk” consider that the appropriate kind of 
research is that which informs standard risk assessments. This is research, 
conducted under DSs in laboratories or small- scale field studies, concerning 
7 If one wants to limit the meaning of “science” to systematic, empirically based 
investigation in which only DSs are adopted, and so by definition not consider adop-
tion of CSs to be “scientific,” so be it. But then it would be disingenuous to maintain 
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the anticipated potential health and environmental effects of using a vari-
ety of GEOs.8 In it, the potential effects and the mechanisms that might 
occasion them are characterized using theoretical categories acceptable 
within DSs, and so the mechanisms considered are physical, chemical, or 
biological. “Risk,” “harm,” and “safe” are value- laden terms, however, and 
so they have no place among the categories acceptable under DSs. Hence 
in order that the results of the research may be pertinent for risk assess-
ments, prior to conducting them, some of the anticipated potential effects 
are labeled “risks” (“ethically significant risks”)— in accordance with value 
judgments that effects of that kind would be harmful. Then the potential 
effects so labeled are investigated empirically in order to find out about 
their magnitude, the conditions in which they may actually be brought 
about, the probability of their occurrence, and the conditions for effec-
tively regulating and thereby containing them (Lacey 2005, 2017b). Those 
who endorse “no risk” generally maintain that the main evidence for it has 
come from empirical studies concerning the potential significant risks of 
GEO varieties that have been released for agricultural and commercial use, 
and that “no risk” has been properly endorsed because sufficient studies 
have been conducted, and in light of them it has been judged that none 
of these varieties occasions risks (potential effects that have been labeled 
“risks”) of significant magnitude and likelihood of actually occurring that 
cannot be adequately managed under approved regulations. This point of 
view underlies the proposal that standard risk assessments, based on the 
kind of investigations just described, are constitutive of and sufficient for 
“science- based regulatory policy.” It also provides the rationale that sup-
ports legislation, obtaining in most countries, that no variety of GEOs may 
be released for agricultural and related commercial purposes, unless regula-
tory bodies certify that it has passed an appropriate and sufficient array of 
standard risk assessments that also provide the basis for approved regula-
tions governing its use.
It is a value judgment, though, not a scientific result that sufficient 
properly conducted standard risk assessments are the appropriate basis for 
appraising risks and endorsing “no risk” (Lacey 2005, 2017b). In accordance 
8 Risk assessments should be conducted case by case, and variety/environment by 
variety/environment. Using some varieties of GEOs may occasion serious risks, and 


























with it, risks that cannot be investigated in these assessments (under DSs) 
need not be considered in science- based deliberations about the commer-
cial release of GEOs. For those who maintain “primacy of DSs,” this value 
judgment may be seen simply as a consequence of affirming that regula-
tory policy should be based on “sound science.” But that affirmation is 
a value judgment too. Why are risks that require CSs for their investiga-
tion not relevant to science- based regulatory policy? The matter cannot 
be reasonably settled by fiat, and scientists qua scientists have no special 
competence to deal with value judgments. “No risk” cannot become an 
item of established scientific knowledge so long as judgments made about 
it depend on this value judgment. Furthermore, it could not become one, 
unless adequate rebuttals were made of the opponents’ counterclaims that 
evidence (obtained in research conducted under CSs) challenges it and the 
risk assessments that have actually informed regulatory deliberations have 
serious shortcomings.
In light of the complexities, uncertainties, and time limitations sur-
rounding risk assessments, and the impossibility of anticipating all the 
risks that might arise in the future, it is unlikely that a large stock of sci-
entific knowledge can be established about risks. Even so, evidence may 
be obtained that convincingly supports endorsements about risks (see 
the “Conceptions of Scientific Methodology” section above). When mak-
ing endorsements, value judgments are always implicated in some ways, 
including when endorsing “no risk” (and “there are risks”) and making the 
judgment (in public policy deliberations) that the available evidence is suf-
ficiently strong to endorse “no risk” (Lacey 2015c; cf. Douglas 2009).9 “No 
risk” might become convincingly endorsed, if there were good reasons to 
hold the value judgment about the sufficiency of standard risk assessments, 
and (for some) commitment to the values of technological progress and of 
capital and the market may be considered to provide such reasons. Else-
where I have argued that there are mutually reinforcing relations between 
commitment to “primacy of DSs” and holding values of technological pro-
gress (Lacey 1999, 2005). This often underlies taking efficacy to be (ceteris 
paribus) sufficient for legitimacy (Lacey 2016) and misidentifying endorse-
ments as items of established scientific knowledge. Whatever agreement 
9 The standard organs for scientific communication and evaluation are not well 
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may exist among mainstream scientists concerning the endorsement of 
“no risk” may be accounted for largely by the fact that “primacy of DSs” is 
widely held among them. “Primacy of DSs” also tends to be held among 
members of regulatory bodies that deal with GEOs. In both cases, this may 
be reinforced by their holding values of technological progress that, in turn, 
is reinforced by holding values of capital and the market (Lacey 2016). 
When regulatory deliberations about risks are informed only by evidence 
obtained in the course of standard risk assessments, they will be marred by 
ignorance that has been effectively generated and maintained by holding 
“primacy of DSs,” and the consequent ignoring or downplaying of relevant 
research conducted under CSs (see “The Appropriateness of Relying Only 
on Standard Risk Assessments” section below).
Those who hold the opponents’ values contest the value judgment that 
sufficient properly conducted standard risk assessments are the appropri-
ate basis for appraisals of risks and are likely to endorse “there are risks.” 
Of course, their values cannot provide a ground for rejecting “no risk.” 
Holding them makes them aware, however, that the role played by “pri-
macy of DSs” in regulatory deliberations is part of the functioning of an 
agnotology mechanism, and motivates their insistence on the importance 
of conducting the empirical investigations under CSs that can contribute to 
eliminating the ignorance. In addition to contesting the value judgment, the 
opponents challenge the apparent factual claim that properly conducted 
standard risk assessments have been carried out for the GEO varieties that 
have been commercially released.10
3.2. Shortcomings of Standard Risk Assessments Actually Conducted on 
GEOs
Consider first criticisms made of the factual claim. Critics have alleged that 
standard risk assessments— which have been made of the varieties of GEOs 
released for agricultural and commercial use, and have actually informed 
the deliberations of regulatory bodies— have been marred by a variety of 
10 Rarely do advocates of using GEOs show awareness that the opponents ques-
tion the value judgment as well as factual claim. Their efforts to rebut criticisms of 
the factual claim often appeal to the “technical” character of the studies conducted 
in standard risk assessments and the authority they accord to “technical” scientific 


























shortcomings.11 These shortcomings include that (1) in many cases, they 
are not based on “sound science”; (2) typically they presuppose the prin-
ciple of substantial equivalence; (3) they have not adequately taken into 
account all the sources and kinds of health risks that need to be investi-
gated, and whether some of the risks that have actually been identified can 
be adequately managed; and (4) rarely are they subject to further testing in 
light of ongoing monitoring in the contexts of their actual use.
Regarding (1), the proponents of GEOs ironically often wave the ban-
ner of “sound science,” which they take to involve the virtually exclusive 
adoption of DSs. Yet most of the standard risk assessments considered by 
regulatory bodies are based on research conducted by scientists employed 
or funded by agribusiness corporations; their results are restricted as “con-
fidential,” and in the name of protecting intellectual property rights, bar-
riers are put in the way of independent review and attempted replicability. 
The point here is not just that confidential studies might be hiding some-
thing. Throughout the tradition of modern science, it has constantly been 
emphasized that “sound science” requires that transparency, public scru-
tiny, and independent replicability be the norm (Royal Society 2012)— 
which may be overridden in exceptional circumstances, such as wartime 
security— in order to counter possible conflicts of interest and agnotology 
mechanisms. Especially since agribusiness corporations have a strong inter-
est in “no risk” being endorsed, public scrutiny is crucial for having confi-
dence in the results of the risk assessments. Proponents of GEOs point out 
that independent studies have not provided evidence against “no risk,” and 
they frequently insinuate that opponents, by insisting that such studies be 
conducted, are really just deploying the mechanisms of construct agnotol-
ogy. This is disingenuous. It is true that independent studies have not pro-
vided compelling or definitive evidence against “no risk.” There have been 
relatively few of them— in large part because agribusiness normally denies 
11 I state the allegations selectively, summarily, and without appraisal, and only as 
they pertain to assessments of risks to human health. For a useful single source for 
documentation of the risks and the evidence backing them, and who makes them, 
see Traavik and Ching 2007. The alleged shortcomings are frequently said to involve 
the play of additional agnotology mechanisms (which I will not discuss), including 
lack of transparency, attributing scientific authority to claims that have questionable 
empirical backing, not attempting to acquire (or suppressing) relevant evidence and 
find out about relevant evidence that is not published in English- language scientific 
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access to the seeds of GEOs needed to conduct them, it makes use of the 
legal mechanisms of intellectual property rights to restrict their use, and the 
contractually approved uses of these seeds do not include using them for 
scientific studies (Dalton and Diego 2002; Pollack 2009; Waltz 2009). This 
reinforces skepticism about the results of the confidential studies, especially 
since there is a growing number of independent standard risk assessments 
that do provide prima facie (albeit not definitive) evidence of serious risks 
(Ferment et al. 2015; Krimsky 2015). This skepticism is deepened in light 
of the response of scientists linked with agribusiness to these studies, for 
it tends to include campaigns aimed at discrediting the scientific quality 
of the studies and besmirching the scientific reputation of the indepen-
dent researchers— without carrying out replications of the studies in a way 
designed to eliminate the unacceptable features that the independent stud-
ies allegedly have, and so bypassing the time- tested approach of the modern 
scientific tradition to resolving disputes (Krimsky 2015; Lacey 2017b).
In regard to (2), the principle of substantial equivalence, in the US Food 
and Drug Administration version, states that “in most cases the substances 
expected to become components of food as a result of genetic modification 
will be the same as or substantially similar to substances commonly found 
in food such as proteins, fats and oils, and carbohydrates.” It is appealed to 
in order to build into regulatory deliberations that the default presumption 
(as with varieties grown in “conventional” farming) is “no risk,” GEOs need 
no more stringent scrutiny than conventional varieties, and hence a high 
burden of proof needs to be met in standard risk assessments conducted 
on GEOs in order to override this presumption. This helps to explain why 
regulatory bodies tend to show little interest in rebutting the alleged short-
comings referred to connected with (1), (3), and (4). The status of this prin-
ciple, however, is a matter of dispute. Many scientists question that it is 
empirically well based, and some maintain that it has been disconfirmed. 
Its role in regulatory deliberations, which frequently is required by legisla-
tion that is linked with international trade accords, does not have the sup-
port of empirically backed scientific consensus (cf. Traavik, Nielsen, and 
Quist 2007).
In regard to (3), growing GEOs requires the extensive use of inputs 
(that vary from variety to variety) that are often toxic and derived from 
petrochemicals, so that the risks occasioned by their use cannot be sepa-


























together with the inputs required for effectively using them (Lacey 2017a). 
Thus the risks to human health (and harmful effects that may have already 
occurred) include those that may arise from ingesting pesticide and her-
bicide residue as well the engineered genetic materials, and exposure to 
pesticides and herbicides used with the growing of GEO crops. These risks 
have physical, chemical, and biological mechanisms, and can be investi-
gated under DSs (as they are in some of the studies cited below), and so 
they can be addressed in standard risk assessments. Nevertheless, the risk 
assessments concerning human health that have informed regulatory deci-
sions about GEOs rarely go beyond investigating the risks of ingesting the 
modified genetic materials. They do not take into account (among oth-
ers) risks that may be occasioned by ingesting the residue of the associated 
inputs (see, for example, Séralini et al. 2014), links between exposure to 
glyphosate (the herbicide to which many varieties of GEOs are resistant) 
and fetal and birth abnormalities that have been identified, for example, in 
Argentina (Antoniou et al. 2011; Paganelli et al. 2010), and possible links 
between increased exposure to pesticides and deaths from colon cancer in 
Brazil (Martin et al. 2018).
Finally, concerning (4), the alleged shortcomings already discussed moti-
vate questioning the sufficiency of risk assessments that are not regularly 
revisited in light of the ongoing monitoring of the impact of consuming 
products containing GEOs (and chemical residues) along with the environ-
mental and social impacts of growing them. Uncertainties are always likely 
to be present in risk assessments, and ongoing monitoring may provide fur-
ther data, especially concerning potential long- term harm, that might lead 
to reversals of judgments, but the possibility of long- term epidemiological 
studies of the health risks of using GEOs, for instance, is severely inhibited 
by the opposition of agribusiness and many governments to the labeling 
of GEO- products.
These alleged shortcomings concern the risk assessments that have 
informed the decisions actually made about the commercial release and 
regulation of GEOs and their products. They could be eliminated by open-
ing the assessments to scrutiny and replicability in independent studies, 
being responsive to problems raised in such studies, and complementing 
them with the ongoing monitoring of risks (and harm that may be actually 
caused) in contexts of use and then an openness to make revisions in light 
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3.3. The Appropriateness of Relying Only on Standard Risk Assessments
Nevertheless, according to the opponents, even if the alleged shortcom-
ings were taken care of and then the standard risk assessments actually 
carried out on a variety of GEOs provided no support for “there are risks,” 
that would not amount to adequate support for endorsing that the variety 
can be safely used in the environmental/social contexts in which it is actu-
ally used. They maintain that adequate appraisal of “no risk” depends on 
outcomes of research conducted under CSs as well as those of standard risk 
assessments.13 Hence their contesting the value judgment that sufficient 
properly conducted standard risk assessments are the appropriate basis for 
assessments of risks would be unaffected by taking care of the alleged short-
comings. For the opponents, the risks that need to be assessed are those 
that might be occasioned (or the harm that already has been occasioned)— 
taking into account all the causal mechanisms involved, socioeconomic 
as well as physical, chemical, and biological mechanisms— in the agroeco-
systems in which the GEOs are planted and cultivated, and the socioeco-
nomic contexts in which they have been developed, produced, marketed, 
processed, and consumed.
The investigations that are part of standard risk assessments are con-
ducted in experimental spaces that can deal only with the short- term 
impacts of using GEOs on health and the environment that are occasioned 
by physical, chemical, and biological mechanisms grounded in GEOs being 
biological and technoscientific entities (Lacey 2017a, 2017b). The oppo-
nents question not the necessity and value of conducting them well but 
rather their sufficiency. These investigations (since they only use DSs) do 
not take into consideration, for example, that some risks are likely to be 
magnified as GEOs are more widely used, they may derive from inadequate 
regulatory oversight of the actual uses of GEOs, it could take years before 
some harmful effects become apparent (Lacey 2017b), risks of occasion-
ing irreversible harm may arise by virtue of the dominant place that GEO- 
oriented agriculture has assumed in the global food/agricultural and market 
system (Lacey 2015b), and some risks are occasioned by mechanisms that 
12 Kitcher’s (2011, 105– 137) notion of “well- ordered science” might profitably be 
used to elaborate this suggestion.
13 I am using “risk” in its colloquial sense of “potential harmful effect,” not in the 
technical sense (typically used in standard risk assessments) according to which the 


























are grounded in GEOs being commercial objects whose uses are constrained 
by claims of intellectual property rights. Short- term experimental studies, 
which are insensitive to potentially relevant variables that may be opera-
tive in the many and variable social and environmental contexts in which 
GEOs are used, can provide no evidence that harmful effects of the kinds 
mentioned are not being risked. Even if standard risk assessments were 
exhaustively conducted, the necessary and appropriate kinds of research 
still remain to be conducted under CSs.
The opposition (“no risk”/“there are risks”), therefore involves not just 
disagreement about which claim is best supported by the available evidence; 
it is implicated in the methodological opposition expressed in “primacy of 
DSs”/“strategic pluralism”). Holding “primacy of DSs” leads to discarding 
research conducted under CSs, and as such, fosters ignorance concerning 
evidence that is needed for reasonably resolving the opposition. Thus when 
“no risk” is endorsed on the basis of standard risk assessments, holding 
“primacy of DSs” functions as an agnotology mechanism. Of course, con-
ducting the research under CSs, deemed crucial by the opponents, would 
be difficult, time intensive, controversial, and expensive, and curtailing the 
use of some GEOs, pending the outcome of the research (as required by 
the precautionary principle), would be costly to the corporations that have 
developed them for commercial use.
4. Alternatives
Even if, following research in which both CSs and DSs were adopted, “no 
risk” were routinely to become endorsed for the varieties of GEOs tested, it 
would not follow that GEOs should be given high salience in public agri-
cultural policies— for there might be compelling reasons to endorse “better 
alternatives.” In many regulatory deliberations, “no risk” functions in con-
cert with “no alternative.” The proponents of using GEOs maintain that cur-
rently proposed alternatives are not capable of “feeding the world” (in the 
long run as well as obviously in the short run), and thus endorsing “better 
alternatives” runs the risk that not everyone will be fed and nourished— a 
risk so momentous that compared to it, the risks that the opponents cite 
fall into insignificance. While this does not amount to establishing “no 
risk,” the fact that members of regulatory bodies tend to endorse “no alter-
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toward the criticisms referred to above, and their considering the research 
proposed to be conducted under CSs to be irrelevant and distracting as well 
as time intensive, costly, and “politically motivated.”
Be that as it may, if there were good empirically derived grounds avail-
able to endorse “no alternative,” that would indeed recast the argument 
toward endorsing a suitably qualified statement of “no risk” and justifying 
giving priority to using GEOs in public agricultural policies. Those grounds 
could not be available, however, so long as compelling rebuttals are not pro-
duced of the opponents’ claims that the available evidence (obtained from 
research in which CSs as well as DSs are adopted) points toward endorsing 
“better alternatives,” and without the further development of agroecology, 
the current patterns of hunger are likely to continue. Such rebuttals cannot 
ignore the growing body of research that suggests that if the current pat-
terns of food insecurity are to be redressed, and the food and nutrition needs 
of everyone met, a variety of farming approaches needs to be consolidated, 
and it is a matter of priority and urgency to make funding available for 
research that contributes toward developments of agroecology (and other 
approaches that are simpler, cheaper, more sustainable, and locally appro-
priate), in which introducing technoscientific innovations (like GEOs) is 
not the driving force (see, for example, De Schutter 2010, 2014; Food and 
Agriculture Organization 2014; McIntyre et al. 2009; Pretty 2008; Pretty 
et al. 2006; Rosset and Altieri 2017). In most of these publications, agro-
ecology is highlighted and its current successes are noted; it is indicated 
that further research needs to be conducted concerning the proper place 
of agroecology among the variety of needed agricultural approaches (and 
what its limitations might be), and how it may vary with the characteristics 
of local agroecosystems, the needs of different locales, and the cultures and 
values of their inhabitants; it is not foreclosed that there may be a role for 
using GEOs in the varied mix of needed agricultural approaches; and it is 
stressed that GEOs should not be prioritized at the expense of agroecology 
in current agricultural research.14 Research that addresses these matters can-
not be conducted without adopting CSs, so that sound empirically based 
14 It is not preordained that research on alternatives that adopts CSs will lead to 
the conclusion that there is no role, or only a minor one, for GEOs. In a few of the 
publications cited, a significant role for using GEOs is anticipated; in others (see, for 
example, Rosset and Altieri 2017) it is argued that the research that has been con-


























judgments concerning them cannot be made on the basis of empirical data 
obtained only in investigation that incorporates “primacy of DSs.”
I am not aware of any writings by those who endorse “no alternative” 
and prioritize the research and development of GEOs that show awareness 
of these matters, or attempt to rebut the claim that current patterns of hun-
ger are likely to continue unless agroecological and related methods are 
developed and implemented.15 The research reported in those writings is 
conducted under DSs. It includes results that inform standard risk assess-
ments and generalizations drawn from them. But mostly it addresses ques-
tions like, What traits, potentially useful to the objectives of agribusiness 
along with the related interests of governments, farmers, and consumers, 
can be engineered into crop plants using the techniques of genetic recom-
bination? The answers contribute to strengthening and expanding the uses 
of GEOs in agriculture, and may inform decisions made by public policy 
bodies, encourage funding bodies to invest more in research on the pos-
sibilities of GEOs, and motivate individual scientists to engage in it. Yet 
they cannot provide support for “no alternative,” or generally, apart from 
where the interests just mentioned are dominant, giving priority to devel-
oping and implementing GEO- intensive agriculture. In practice, the pro-
ponents of GEOs tend to take “no alternative” for granted, and adopt the 
attitude that if using GEOs is efficacious and viable, little more legitimation 
for developing and using them is needed other than that it serves their 
interests. Holding this view is reinforced by the widely held conviction that 
in modern democratic societies, the trajectory toward the future is largely 
determined by technoscientific innovations (developed in the course of 
research conducted under DSs) that may contribute to economic growth 
(Lacey 2016).16 Moreover, the influence of agribusiness in regulatory bodies, 
governments, and the press ensures that there is little public awareness of 
the science- based questioning of the safety of using GEOs and possibilities 
of alternatives, and its dominance in agricultural (including seed) markets 
15 Agroecology is occasionally mentioned in these writings, but just to dismiss its 
significance by suggesting that it is a kind of romantic throwback to an idyllic past, 
or perhaps an approach with a role in some limited niches.
16 Research conducted with DSs might contribute to support claims such as that 
“there are no alternatives to using GEOs within the current trajectory of capital and 
the market or within the hegemonic food/agricultural system” (Lacey 2005, 230– 
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becomes a causal factor that is preventing the development of alternatives. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that in the discourse of legitimacy of using 
GEOs, “no alternative” plays an important role in countering arguments 
that “there are risks” (Lacey 2017a), but having good grounds to endorse 
“no alternative” depends not on the power exercised by large agribusiness 
corporations and their allies but instead on successfully rebutting that the 
available evidence points toward endorsing “better alternatives.”
The opponents, by virtue of upholding “strategic pluralism,” advocate 
conducting research that deals with the possibilities for strengthening and 
expanding agroecological practices— and also with the limitations that 
they may have (Lacey 2015b) and so that research could lead to obtaining 
evidence that would put “better alternatives” in doubt. Moreover, although 
they may hold that prioritizing research connected with GEOs is misguided, 
their upholding “strategic pluralism” per se poses no impediments to 
engaging in research that explores the possibilities of producing and using 
GEOs. On the other hand, holding “primacy of DSs” impedes conducting 
research on the possibilities of the alternatives like agroecology. It thereby 
hinders engaging in the kind of research (conducted under CSs) that could 
produce empirical data relevant for testing “no alternative” (and permits 
ignoring results actually obtained in that research), and it is an obstacle to 
overcoming ignorance on issues that are at the heart of important policy 
decisions. Just as regarding matters concerning risks, holding “primacy of 
DSs” functions as an agnotology mechanism when dealing with questions 
about alternatives.
5. Concluding Remarks
I have maintained that in the discourse of legitimation that has accom-
panied the introduction and spread of GEOs, holding a particular view of 
the nature of scientific methodologies— “primacy of DSs”— functions as an 
agnotology mechanism. It leads to the fostering of ignorance about the 
risks that are occasioned by mechanisms grounded in GEOs being socio-
economic objects as well as the possibilities of agroecology: research that 
could provide knowledge about these risks and possibilities is not pursued; 
the scientific credentials of research conducted under CSs that might gen-
erate such knowledge are rejected; and claims (such as “no risk” or “no 


























to pass for scientific knowledge. A necessary condition for remedying this 
state of affairs along with the distortion of regulatory deliberations that it 
engenders is to adopt the conception of scientific research as systematic 
empirical investigation conducted under whatever strategies (DSs or CSs) 
are apt for gaining knowledge and understanding of the phenomena being 
investigated.
References
Antoniou, Michael N., Mohamed Habib, C. Vyvyan Howard, Richard C. Jennings, 
Carlo Leifert,  Rubens Nodari, Claire Robinson, and John Fagan. 2011. Roundup and 
Birth Defects: Is the Public Being Kept in the Dark? London: Earth Open Source.
Carneiro, Fernando Ferreira, Raquel Maria Rigotto, Lia Giraldo da Silva Augusto, 
Karen Friedrich, and André Campos Búrigo, eds. 2015. Dossiê ABRASCO: Um alerta 
sobre os impactos dos agrotóxicos na saúde. Rio de Janeiro: Escola Politécnica de Saúde 
Joaquim Venâncio.
Dalton, Rex, and San Diego. 2002. “Superweed Study Falters as Seed Firms Deny 
Access to Transgene.” Nature 419 (October): 655.
De Schutter, Oliver. 2010. Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development. UN Human 
Rights Council, December 20. Accessed November 15, 2018, http://www.srfood.org/
images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20110308_a-hrc-16-49_agroecology_en.pdf.
De Schutter, Oliver. 2014. Final Report: The Transformative Potential of the Right to 
Food. UN Human Rights Council, January 24. Accessed November 15, 2018, http://
www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20140310_finalreport_en.pdf.
Douglas, Heather. 2009. Science, Policy, and the Value- Free Ideal. Pittsburgh: Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Press.
Ferment, Gilles, Leonardo Melgarejo, Gabriel Bianconi Fernandes, and José Maria 
Ferraz. 2015. Lavouras Transgênicas: Riscos e incertezas, mais de 750 estudos desprezados 
pelos órgãos reguladores de OGMs. Brasília: Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrária.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2014. “Video Summary 
of the International Symposium on Agroecology for Food Security and Nutrition.” 
Rome, September 18– 19. Accessed November 15, 2018, http://www.fao.org/about/
meetings/afns/en/.
Hilbeck, Angelika, Rosa Binimelis, Nicolas Defarge, Ricarda Steinbrecher, András 
Székács, Fern Wickson, Michael Antoniou, Philip L. Bereano, Ethel Ann Clark, 

























Scientific Methodology as a Source of Ignorance 269
and Brian Wynne. 2015. “No Scientific Consensus on GEO Safety.” Environmental 
Sciences Europe 27 (4): 4– 9.
Kitcher, Philip. 2011. Science in a Democratic Society. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Krimsky, Sheldon. 2015. “An Illusory Consensus behind GEO Health Assessment.” 
Science, Technology, and Human Values 40:883– 914.
Lacey, Hugh. 1999. Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Understanding. London: 
Routledge.
Lacey, Hugh. 2005. Values and Objectivity in Science: Current Controversy about Trans-
genic Crops. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Lacey, Hugh. 2015a. “Agroécologie: la science et les valeurs de la justice sociale, de la 
démocratie et de la durabilité.” Ecologie et Politique 51:27– 40.
Lacey, Hugh. 2015b. “Food and Agricultural Systems for the Future: Science, Emanci-
pation and Human Flourishing.” Journal of Critical Realism 14, no. 3 (June): 272– 286.
Lacey, Hugh. 2015c. “‘Holding’ and ‘Endorsing’ Claims in the Course of Scientific 
Activities.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 53:89– 95.
Lacey, Hugh. 2016. “Science, Respect for Nature, and Human Well- Being: Demo-
cratic Values and the Responsibilities of Scientists Today.” Foundations of Science 21 
(1): 51– 67.
Lacey, Hugh. 2017a. “The Life and Times of Transgenics.” In Research Objects in Their 
Technological Setting, edited by Bernadette Bensaude Vincent, Sachs Loeve, Alfred 
Nordmann, and Astrid Schwarz, 150– 165. London: Routledge.
Lacey, Hugh. 2017b. “The Safety of Using Genetically Engineered Organisms: Empir-
ical Evidence and Value Judgments.” Public Affairs Quarterly 31:259– 279.
Magnus, David. 2008. “Risk Management versus the Precautionary Principle: 
Agnotology as a Strategy in the Debate over Genetically Engineered Organisms.” In 
Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance, edited by Robert N. Proctor and 
Londa Schiebinger, 250– 265. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Martin, Francis L., Edson Z. Martinez, Helga Stopper, Sergio Britto Garcia, Sergio 
Akira Uyemura, and Vinicius Kannen. 2018. “Increased Exposure to Pesticides and 
Colon Cancer: Early Evidence in Brazil.” Chemosphere 209:623– 631.
McIntyre, Beverly D., Hans R. Here’s, Judi Wakhungu, and Robert T. Watson. 2009. 
Agriculture at a Crossroads: Synthesis Report of the International Assessment of Agricul-
tural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development. Washington, DC: Island 
Press.
Paganelli, Alejandra, Victoria Gnazzo, Helena Acosta, Silvia L. López, and Andrés 


























Vertebrates by Impairing Retinoic Acid Signaling.” Chemical Research in Toxicology 
23, no. 10 (October): 1586– 1595.
Pollack, Andrew. 2009. “Crop Scientists Say Biotechnology Seed Companies Are 
Thwarting Research.” New York Times, February 19. Accessed November 15, 2018, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/business/20crop.html?_r=2&emc=eta1.
Pretty, Jules N. 2008. “Agricultural Sustainability: Concepts, Principles and Evi-
dence.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 363 (1491): 447– 465.
Pretty, Jules N., Andrew D. Noble, Deborah A. Bossio, John Charles Dixon, Rachel 
Elizabeth Hine, F. W. T. Penning de Vries, and James I. L. Morison. 2006. “Resource- 
Conserving Agriculture Increases Yields in Developing Countries.” Environmental 
Science and Technology 40 (4): 1114– 1119.
Rosset, Peter M., and Miguel A. Altieri. 2017. Agroecology: Science and Politics. Black 
Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing Company.
Royal Society. 2012. Science as an Open Enterprise. Accessed November 15, 2018, 
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/sape/ 
2012-06-20-SAOE.pdf.
Séralini, Gilles- Eric, Emilie Clair, Robin Mesnage, Steeve Gress, Nicolas Defarge, 
Manuela Malatesta, Didier Hennequin, and Joël Spiroux de Vendômois. 2014. 
“Republished Study: Long- term Toxicity of a Roundup Herbicide and a Roundup- 
Tolerant Genetically Modified Maize.” Environmental Sciences Europe 26 (1): 14– 31.
Traavik, Terje, and Lim Li, eds. Ching. 2007. Biosafety First: Holistic Approaches to Risk 
and Uncertainty in Genetic Engineering and Genetically Modified Organisms. Trondheim, 
Norway: Tapir Academic Press.
Traavik, Terje, Kaare M. Nielsen, and David Quist. 2007. “Genetically Modified Cells 
and Organisms: Substantially Equivalent or Different?” In Biosafety First: Holistic 
Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty in Genetic Engineering and Genetically Modified 
Organisms, edited by Terje Traavik and Lim Li Ching, 137– 152. Trondheim, Norway: 
Tapir Academic Press.
Waltz Emily. 2009. “GM Crops: Battlefield.” Nature 461, no. 7260 (September): 
27– 32.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
02
0.
 M
IT
 P
re
ss
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
